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Pidgin and other IM Clients with OTR capability have a feature called 'Convert HTML', which basically removes HTML tags out of the incoming messages. The problem is that if you communicate with Profanity and OTR to a Pidgin client, HTML is bloating the text and it's very difficult to read.

This is especially true if you're talking to someone using Adium () as you will get spammed with. An example copy-paste on something with URL and quotes. 23:24:58 - M: & quot;inspired by hrf=' ' >Irssi& quot; Anything with a long URL is a complete mess. The XMPP protocol specifies sending text, not HTML. There is an extension for. But this doesn't use the element, and so cannot be used to solve this issue.

OTR allows optionally sending HTML, but OTR is used by many chat protocols, in this case where it is used by XMPP, it makes no sense to send HTML. Hach Bod Incubator Model 205 Manual High School. The same issue has been. Chat clients/servers that send HTML and expect the other end to parse it are assuming the other end is not complaint with the protocol, but Profanity and Conversations are compliant. The other important comment is how do we know if the sender actually want's to send you HTML and not have it parsed? Someone sends 'Use to add a link', we don't want to parse this. Rather than change the core codebase to be non standards compliant, an option now might be a that allows the user to enable parsing of HTML if they wish, maybe even for specific rooms/contacts. I did a quick printf debug earlier and discovered that the HTML I sent with Gajim was not escaped.

This is a total mess. I agree, this cannot be implemented into the core. The best solution would be to find the responsible Adium developers and punch them. The Adium issue is 9 (!) years old and there seems to be no progress. Even if this is implemented as a plugin, it can't just remove all HTML tags it finds.

Do Profanity plugins have access to contact information while they are processing incoming messages? It would be possible to just check what client the contact users and it could automatically apply the relevant cleaning rules. Like remove all tags and HTML-unescape for Adium clients.

I assume Adium escapes the users' input. I can't test now, I don't have access to Apple systems. Whilst the sender's client information is not passed to plugins when a message is received, the plugins themselves are able to use service discovery to find out this information. The plugin would need to: • Listen for presence notifications: prof_on_presence_stanza_receive(stanza). • When a contact or room member appears online, send a: prof.send_stanza(stanza). • Listen for responses to these requests prof_on_iq_stanza_receive(stanza).

• Store the users software version as plugin state. A dictionary for example. • When a new chat/room message is received the plugin can check the dictionary for the software being used by the sender and manipulate the message as needed: prof_pre_chat_message_display(jid, message) and prof_pre_room_message_display(room, nick, message). The plugin uses software version requests to list client software for everyone in a chat room, so might be a useful reference as a starting point.

I think the plugin should maybe have options to: • Parse HTML in all messages • Parse HTML only from specified contacts/rooms • Parse HTML only from specified client software This would handle issues with other clients, and chat service XMPP gateways like Hipchat where HTML is common. Hei guys I've written a fix for the problem - not for all the points discussed in this thread, but at least for the original bug (Strip HTML from OTR messages). Please check it out and leave your feedback: This is a very simple solution using Regex search and replace to solve the problem.

Here is what it does: • replace all br tags with a newline • replace all remaining HTML Tags with an empty string • replace the HTML escaped char && &>&. Does this decode escaped HTML characters? And does this just remove all HTML? Because if so it is unusable as it would replace normal HTML content someone is sending.

I'm also not sure if regex will work reliably - but I haven't tested your solution yet (obviously, you just announced it a few moments ago). I created a sanitise function in python that parses DOM and extracts relevant content but am struggling to get it working as a plugin. I will upload it in a few days, maybe someone can help.

Unfortunately I also encountered several other bugs and problems with profanity that are problematic. Need to address them as well. Firstly thanks for your effort in attempting to fix this, However, as mentioned previously in this thread, the issue is with other clients sending HTML and expecting the receiver to parse it. The clients sending the HTML are making two assumptions that are incorrect: • The receiver will parse HTML. • The person sending the message always wants the HTML they send to be parsed.

The XMPP standard defines the message body as text, not HTML, so any standards complaint clients should not parse incoming messages as HTML. I am not too keen on adding code to Profanity to fix incorrect behaviour other clients, especially when we never know the intention of the sender (do they want it to be parsed or not?). For that reason, I think a plugin is the best option, whilst the plugin itself will still have the same problem of not knowing senders intention, it seems better to me to have the workaround/hack in a plugin rather than the core codebase. So apologies for not wanting to add your code at this point, I know that can be frustrating. Does this decode escaped HTML characters? I thought that should be clear from my comment. But in case it's not, let me provide a detailed example.

Imagine Alice is using Pidgin and Bob profanity. Now Alice will type Hey Bob I really love the HTML tag! Also, check out this rad video: Pidgin will encode the message. Here is what Pidgin will send and subsequently profanity will receive: Hey BobI really love the HTML tag!Also, check out this rad video: As you can see, Pidgin encodes the special characters typed in by Alice. This way it's easy to distinguish the HTML typed by Alice from the HTML added in by Pidgin.

Crysis 3 Trainer Download Pc. Here is what, with my patch enabled, Bob will see: Hey Bob I really love the HTML tag! Also, check out this rad video:: Haha. Except, I'm not trying to parse HTML (nor XML). If you don't understand the difference, please don't try to be funny about it. It might not be all that easy as just to say that the other clients are doing it wrong.

To my knowledge, the reason why XMPP OTR messages are xhtml encoded is this: Not this quote from Ian Goldberg in the mail: For example, suppose there's a Jabber message sent [.], where the body section contains an encryption of 'to put something in bold, wrap around it' and the xhtml section contains an encryption of 'to put something in bold, wrap around it'. Then an adversary replaces the OTR block in the xhtml section with the one from the body section.

An end user with an xhtml-aware client will see 'to put something in bold, wrap around it', and the attacker has successfully modified the message. So you can't both have xhtml and body in an OTR message, at least not with different content. So the situation is an ugly mess from the beginning:(. I've installed the plugin successfully. No idea what I did wrong, maybe I was half asleep because it works now. But Profanity really likes to segfault.

It's probably my fault, but I think a Python plugin shouldn't be able to cause a segfault of the program.:) Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. #0 0x81a08f in PyObject_IsTrue () from /usr/lib/libpython3.5m.so.1.0 (gdb) bt #0 0x81a08f in PyObject_IsTrue () from /usr/lib/libpython3.5m.so.1.0 #1 0x48a5df in python_on_iq_stanza_receive_hook (plugin=0x18e93c0, text=0x199caa0 ') at src/plugins/python_plugins.c:751 #2 0x4848a7 in plugins_on_iq_stanza_receive ( text=0x199caa0 ') at src/plugins/plugins.c:730 #3 0x4290b1 in _iq_handler (conn=0x1987f20, stanza=0x199f850, userdata=0x1987e60) at src/xmpp/iq.c:141 #4 0x78166a in??

() from /usr/lib/libmesode.so.0 #5 0x77e624 in?? () from /usr/lib/libmesode.so.0 #6 0x78a07e in?? () from /usr/lib/libmesode.so.0 #7 0x00007f836c4ca867 in?? () from /usr/lib/libexpat.so.1 #8 0x00007f836c4cb83c in?? () from /usr/lib/libexpat.so.1 #9 0x00007f836c4cfb6f in XML_ParseBuffer () from /usr/lib/libexpat.so.1 #10 0x780e8d in xmpp_run_once () from /usr/lib/libmesode.so.0 #11 0x4283ac in connection_check_events () at src/xmpp/connection.c:97 #12 0x4279a2 in session_process_events () at src/xmpp/session.c:255 #13 0x4210db in prof_run (log_level=0x4b4c20 'INFO', account_name=0x0) at src/profanity.c:123 #14 0x4939f3 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7ffdbdbd7578) at src/main.c:148. I've added the resource argument to the chat message functions: Also added checks on return types for any functions that return something: • If the value is undefined, a message should appear in the console (and the log) and Profanity should carry on as usual.

• The same should happen if the return value is of the wrong type, for example if a hook that should return a string returns an integer • There is no type checking on functions that should return a boolean since python can evaluate all types as a boolean If you have a chance to try and break it again, I'd be interested to see how you get on.